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Abstract 
We study clauses in private lending agreements requiring auditors to assure lenders of borrowers’ 
compliance with financial covenants. Auditors are required under general purpose financial reporting to 
review covenant compliance. However, by informing lenders directly that they have no knowledge of 
default, auditors may increase their litigation risk. We find that auditor covenant compliance assurance 
clauses are significantly associated with more complex contractual adjustments to net income, the extent 
of reliance on accounting information in the contract, intangibility of borrowers’ assets, the number of 
lenders and loan maturity.  We provide novel evidence of the audit market enhancing efficient 
contracting. 
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We study the demand for audit in private lending agreements by examining whether the borrower’s 
auditor is contractually required to assure lenders of borrowers’ compliance with financial covenants. 
Auditors are required under general purpose financial reporting to review covenant compliance. However, 
by informing lenders directly that they have no knowledge of any default, auditors may increase their 
litigation risk. Consistent with predictions from contracting theory, we find that the existence of auditor 
covenant compliance assurance clauses is significantly associated with more complex contractual 
adjustments to GAAP net income, the extent of reliance on accounting information in the contract, the 
level of intangibility of the borrower’s assets, the number of lenders and loan maturity.  As well as 
reporting novel descriptive data on the extent of auditors’ role in reporting directly to private lenders, we 
provide evidence on ways in which the audit market may enhance efficient contracting. 
 
 
JEL classification: K22; M41; M44; M49 
 





Private Lenders’ Demand for Audit 
1. Introduction 
Accounting covenants are widely used in private lending agreements to mitigate conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and lenders. These covenants increase contracting efficiency by 
providing the basis for the optimal allocation of control rights when contracts are incomplete 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012; 
Christensen et al., 2016).1 Auditors are required to check borrowers’ compliance with covenants 
in private lending agreements under GAAP. In particular, accounting and auditing standards 
require auditors to confirm the going concern assumption and to ensure the appropriate 
classification of debt as current or non-current, which entails checking covenant compliance.  In 
addition to these standard obligations to verify compliance, however, auditors may offer a letter 
providing specific negative assurance directly to lenders by certifying that they have no 
knowledge of any default. What is unclear is whether this additional covenant compliance 
assurance occurs at random, or whether it can be explained by efficient contracting. To date, the 
literature has been largely silent on the conditions under which lenders seek such assurance from 
auditors.2 We seek to address this question in this paper. 
 The fact that auditors report on borrowers’ covenant compliance directly to lenders may 
be economically important because of its effects on auditor liability. Under the GAAP regime, 
auditors are not liable to lenders because lenders are regarded as non-contractual third parties to 
standard audit arrangements. Nevertheless, auditors may become liable to third parties depending 
on whether auditors are aware that financial statements are to be used for particular purposes by 
known parties, and whether there is any conduct by the auditors linking them to third parties 
(Feinman, 2015).  Because they require auditors to write to lenders to state they have no 
                                                     
1 In contrast, accounting covenants are rarely used in public debt markets (e.g. Beatty et al., 2012). 
2 Though Watts (1977, footnote 31) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) cite examples of private lending 
agreements containing clauses requiring auditors to offer assurance on covenant compliance. 
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knowledge of any defaults on the covenants, auditor covenant compliance assurance clauses are 
likely to extend auditors’ liability to lenders, even though there is no contract between them. This 
is because it will be more difficult for auditors to convince a court that they were not aware who 
they were reporting to and what their reports were to be used for.  
We present novel descriptive evidence of auditors providing assurance to private lenders 
of borrowers’ compliance with accounting covenants. If the standard GAAP regime is sufficient 
for lenders’ needs, we do not expect to observe systematic associations between lenders’ audit 
demands and borrower or loan characteristics. According to agency theory and the theory of 
incomplete contracting, information asymmetries and contracting efficiency should drive 
observed variation in lenders’ demand for additional assurance. Agency theory predicts that 
covenants appear in debt contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between providers of equity and 
providers of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979). More recent insights 
based on the theory of incomplete contracting view accounting information as part of an efficient 
contracting regime, where financial covenants represent the contingency for the allocation of 
control rights (Christensen et al., 2016).  We draw on these arguments and predict that lenders 
will demand auditor assurance of covenant compliance in an attempt to reduce agency problems 
and to enhance contracting efficiency. Such assurance involves reporting specifically to lenders 
on borrowers’ compliance with the chosen set of contractual accounting definitions (Li, 2010). To 
test our predictions, we conduct a cross-sectional analysis of auditor covenant compliance 
clauses, using a large sample of private lending agreements retrieved from the SEC EDGAR 
archives for the period 1996 to 2012. 
Around 35% of the 6,513 loan agreements in our sample are identified as containing an 
auditor covenant compliance assurance (CCA) clause. After adjusting for the total number of 
financial covenants in loan agreements, the use of CCA clauses is comparatively stable over our 
sample period. We do not find that the use of CCA clauses is concentrated among a few banks or 
industries – their use is widespread. When we explore the sources of the variation in the incidence 
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of CCA clauses, our results are inconsistent with the idea that they are randomly distributed 
across private lending arrangements. In particular, in various empirical specifications, we find 
that private lenders’ demand for independent assurance by auditors is stronger when accounting 
measurement rules depart more from GAAP, when agreements rely more on accounting data 
(either in the form of more accounting covenants or accounting-based performance pricing 
provisions), when borrowers have high levels of harder-to-verify intangible assets, and when 
there are more lenders in the loan syndicate. 
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First and foremost, it provides 
novel empirical evidence that in addition to their standard obligations under GAAP, auditors play 
a role in ameliorating information asymmetries and enhancing contracting efficiency between 
borrowers and lenders. In addition to the information they receive via standard general purpose 
financial statements, lenders also often demand direct assurance from auditors that borrowers 
have conformed to the negotiated measurement rules specified in the contract. These results are 
consistent with Li’s (2010) conjecture that more extensive departures from GAAP rules involve 
higher monitoring costs for lenders and may help explain why debt contracts often contain 
comparatively few accounting ratios (Christensen et al., 2016).3 
Our results contribute to the contracting literature by indicating that covenant compliance 
assurance by auditors is associated with borrower and loan characteristics. Furthermore, our 
findings suggest that when it is deemed optimal by contracting parties, auditor covenant 
compliance assurance may facilitate contracting on the basis of intangible assets that are harder to 
verify (Frankel et al., 2008). Our results also contribute to the agency literature by showing that 
the number of lenders in loan syndicates is positively associated with explicit requirements for 
auditor assurance of covenant compliance. This may be due to reduced monitoring effectiveness 
                                                     
3 We do not study the magnitude of the additional costs associated with auditor CCA clauses. Identifying 
the costs from secondary data may be difficult for at least two reasons. First, the classification of the 
associated fees as audit or non-audit may be blurred in practice. Second, even though the additional audit 
costs may be high relative to the costs of contracting, they may be low (and thus hard to detect) relative to 
the fees paid for the main audit. 
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induced by large loan syndicates or because of higher renegotiation costs in the event of a 
misclassified covenant violation. Finally, and more broadly, our research contributes to the 
growing evidence on the importance and influence of private lenders as active participants in 
financial reporting and corporate governance mechanisms.  Although several studies have 
examined the role of auditors in stock markets and public debt markets (e.g. Teoh and Wong, 
1993; Mansi et al., 2004; Lou and Vasvari, 2013), evidence on their role in private debt markets 
remains scarce (Menon and Williams, 2016). This is in spite of reports that corporations raise 
more capital from banks than from public debt and equity markets combined (Ferreira and Matos, 
2012; Nini et al., 2009; Sufi, 2007). Our findings thus contribute to the nascent literature 
demonstrating that banks exert influence over borrowers’ corporate governance processes, even 
outside default states (Triantis and Daniels, 1995; Nini et al., 2012; Christensen et al., 2016).  
Overall, our research indicates that auditors fulfill important functions in private debt 
markets in addition to their main responsibilities under GAAP. We emphasize at the outset, 
however, that although our analyses are guided by theory, our study is exploratory and as such, 
only allows us to document statistical associations, not causal relationships. As is common in this 
field, our results are vulnerable to concerns that different contractual features are determined 
simultaneously (Armstrong et al., 2010). 
In section 2, we outline the regulatory and legal background to the auditor-lender 
relationship and review relevant prior literature. In section 3, we develop our hypotheses. Section 
4 outlines our sample and data collection methods and describes our primary measure of private 
lenders’ demand for audit. Section 5 presents our empirical results and we summarize and 






2. Background and prior literature  
2.1 Auditors’ responsibilities under GAAP and legal liability 
In the absence of any audit arrangements between contracting parties, auditors are required 
to test whether borrowers are in compliance with debt covenants as part of the annual audit under 
GAAP. In particular, ASC 470 Debt requires auditors to classify debt as current when clients 
violate any covenants set out in the loan agreement.4 Hence, unless the debt is already classified 
as current, auditors check borrowers’ compliance with covenants as a matter of routine. 
An important feature of the GAAP regime is that auditors’ responsibility is to shareholders. 
This seems unsatisfactory from the point of view of lenders, who might seek legal redress from 
auditors with ‘deep pockets’ in the event of borrower default. Accordingly, clauses in private 
lending agreements often require auditors to report directly to creditors regarding borrowers’ 
compliance with contractual terms. Auditing standards (for public issuers and non-issuers) 
recognize such obligations and offer guidance to auditors in specifying the limited nature and 
scope of this type of assurance. For public issuers, AS 3305 Special Reports, states: 
… loan agreements usually also require the borrower to furnish annual financial 
statements that have been audited by an independent auditor. In some instances, the 
lenders … may request assurance from the independent auditor that the borrower 
has complied with certain covenants of the agreement relating to accounting 
matters. The independent auditor may satisfy this request by giving negative 
assurance relative to the applicable covenants based on the audit of the financial 
statements.  
This standard goes on to provide an example of a report that auditors may issue to lenders 
under such arrangements.5  There are two important features of this example: (i) it is addressed 
solely to the management of the borrower and a specific bank or lender; and (ii) it only offers 
negative assurance, i.e., it states that nothing came to auditors’ attention that the borrower failed 
to comply with the covenants in the debt contract.  
                                                     
4 This applies whether covenants are written on GAAP or non-GAAP accounting measurement rules.  
5 This is not just a US phenomenon. In the UK, the body representing the professional institutes - the 
Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies - has also issued guidance to auditors  (CCAB, 2000). 
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It is generally accepted that in equity markets, auditors play an insurance role in addition 
to their information role (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). This is not necessarily the case in private 
debt markets, however, because lenders are regarded as third parties to the audit regime. As such, 
auditors are not liable to lenders unless certain conditions are met. The extent of auditors’ liability 
to lenders depends on which of the four legal standard courts apply: (i) privity, (ii) near privity, 
(iii) restatement (or known users), or (iv) reasonable foreseeability.6  
We expect covenant compliance assurance clauses to increase auditors’ liability to 
lenders under the two most commonly applied standards – near privity and restatement.7 First, 
under a restatement approach, where inaccurate information supplied by auditors is reasonably 
relied on by creditors and banks (or other non clients), auditors are held liable, as long as the third 
parties relying on the reports are known to the them (Scherl, 1994, p. 273). Because CCA clauses 
involve auditors writing to lenders, it will be difficult for them to argue that they were unaware 
that lenders were relying on the information they provide. Second, under near privity, while the 
CCA clauses may not automatically be sufficient to establish a direct relationship between the 
auditor and the lenders, courts sometimes interpret the necessary linking conduct as ‘some 
communication or contacts demonstrating the accountant’s awareness of the third party’s 
                                                     
6 Strict privity is the most restrictive standard under which a third party can hold an auditor liable for 
negligence.  This requires there to have been a direct contractual relationship between the auditor and the 
third party and is only adopted in a handful of states (Anatharman et al., 2016).  Near privity relaxes the 
direct contractual requirement, but (i) auditors must have been aware that their reports were to be used for a 
particular purpose; (ii) auditors must have known that the third party intended to rely on the reports; and 
(iii) there must have been linking conduct between the auditors and the third party, indicating that auditors 
understood the third party’s reliance on their reports (Scherl, 1994; Pacini et al., 2000). Restatement further 
expands auditor liability for negligence, so that the auditor is not required to know the exact identity of the 
third party in order to be held liable; however, the third party must still belong to a limited group of persons 
for whose benefit and guidance the auditor supplies the information or knows that the recipient intends to 
supply it (Anatharaman et al. 2016). Reasonable foreseeability represents the broadest definition of third 
parties to whom the auditor is held liable. Under this standard, the auditor owes a duty to all those they 
should reasonably foresee as recipients from the company of the statements, as long as the recipients rely 
on the information for business purposes (Anatharaman et al., 2016). 
7 Anatharaman et al. (2016) report that 21.6% of states follow near privity, while 62.7% follow the 
restatement approach. We do not expect CCA clauses to increase auditors’ liability under a strict privity 
approach, because there is no contract between the auditor and the lenders. Under the most expansive 
reasonable foreseeable approach, it is unclear whether CCA clauses are necessary to impose liability on 
auditors. For example, auditors may be expected to foresee lenders’ reliance on their reports without any 
direct correspondence between the parties. 
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reliance’ (Feinman, 2015, p. 146). We expect CCA clauses to lead to direct communication 
between the auditor and the lenders, increasing the likelihood that courts will find auditors liable. 
 The recent case of GSP Finance versus KPMG illustrates that lenders place significant 
emphasis on the assurance provided by auditors – not just via a clean audit report (Menon and 
Williams, 2016), but also through their demand for confirmation of borrowers’ compliance with 
financial covenants.8 This case also suggests that CCA clauses may increase auditors’ litigation 
risk from lenders, even under a strict near-privity standard. 
The case involved a credit facility of over $525 million taken out by the borrower (Hicks 
Sports), $67 million of which was supplied by GSP. The lending agreement contained clauses 
requiring the borrower’s auditors, KPMG, to deliver to lenders (1) a clean audit report and (2) a 
letter of compliance with financial covenants, one of which limited borrower’s consolidated total 
debt to $600 million. 
The borrower subsequently defaulted on the payment of the loan. KPMG were sued by 
GSP for providing a clean audit opinion and a letter stating that the borrower was in compliance, 
with the plaintiffs arguing that Hicks had exceeded the $600 million debt threshold. The lenders 
argued that had the borrower’s capital lease obligations been included within the definition of 
consolidated indebtedness (as they had been in previous years), Hicks would have surpassed its 
credit limit, allowing the lenders to exercise control rights that would have reduced their losses. 
The letter of covenant compliance represents an important component of the litigation 
against the auditors in this case.9 The plaintiffs’ testimony also reveals that the contractual 
                                                     
8 Details of the case are available on the web site of the New York Supreme Court (Docket no. 
650841/2011).  
9 The plaintiffs argued ‘Because of its familiarity with the structure, terms, and purpose of the Credit 
Agreements, KPMG was aware that [the borrowers] would transmit both the independent auditor’s report 
and the Compliance Letter to GSP and other lenders, which would rely on the audit opinion and 
Compliance Letter in assessing whether [the borrowers] had breached the Credit Agreement.’ Ultimately, 
the auditors were successful in defending themselves in this case because their letter on covenant 
compliance was issued to ‘noteholders’ as a class, not to GSP as specific lenders.  
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requirement for auditors to confirm compliance with the covenants in the lending agreement was 
an important part of their decision to issue the loan.10 
 This discussion demonstrates that auditor covenant compliance clauses in lending 
agreements are likely to extend auditors’ legal liability to lenders.  If this is the case, contracting 
theory suggests that lenders’ demand for such additional protection will vary according to the 
nature of the loan transaction and/or the characteristics of the borrower. 
 
2.2 Contracting theory and prior literature 
The use of accounting covenants in private debt contracts has traditionally been 
understood to be a manifestation of agency conflicts between lenders and shareholders. Such 
conflicts include the risk of excessive dividend payments, future debt issuance reducing the 
probability of repayment, asset substitution (where firms invest in riskier projects at the expense 
of debt-providers) and underinvestment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner; 1979; 
Armstrong et al., 2010). Financial contracting acts as a primary mechanism for reducing conflicts 
between agents (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a) and outputs of the accounting system often appear in 
debt contracts in the form of clauses on capital expenditures, asset sale restrictions, dividend 
payments, covenants linked to leverage ratios, net worth and cash flow sweeps (e.g. Nini et al., 
2009).  More recent theoretical insights view the presence of accounting figures in debt contracts 
as part of an efficient contracting regime, where accounting data act as contractible signals for the 
state-contingent allocation of control. The main purpose of accounting covenants in this context is 
to efficiently allocate control rights in the event of deteriorating borrower performance 
(Christensen et al., 2016). 
Both agency and incomplete contracting interpretations suggest that the use of accounting 
numbers in debt contracts creates incentives for managers to distort accounting figures. Prior 
                                                     
10 They stated ‘receipt of ongoing financial compliance audited by a known firm was a requirement of the 
deal and was a piece of the puzzle … that would make us lend into a situation’.  
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research documents income-increasing accounting choices in the run-up to covenant violations 
(e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994) and indicates that disputes with auditors 
often follow such choices (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1993). Accordingly, auditors are reported to 
increase their fees in response to debt covenant violations, even in cases where borrowers’ 
financial performance is not necessarily poor (Gao et al., 2016). 
Potential conflicts surrounding debt covenant compliance have been analyzed in 
theoretical models where changes in control are triggered not necessarily by payment default, but 
by realization of verifiable states of the world (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Roberts and Sufi, 
2009a; Christensen et al., 2016). Studies often recognize that resulting incentive conflicts create a 
demand for independent state verification (e.g. Townsend, 1979; Roberts and Sufi, 2009a),11 yet 
to date, there has been limited empirical evidence on whether, when and how this takes place. 
Because the monitoring role of accounting in financial contracting differs from its typical 
‘valuation’ role of informing equity and debt markets (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Ball et al., 
2015), the definitions of accounting data used in debt contracts regularly depart from GAAP (e.g. 
Leftwich, 1983; El-Gazzar and Pastena, 1990; Citron, 1992; Frankel et al., 2008), usually due to 
lenders’ preferences for conservative and more verifiable accounting (Li, 2010; Li, 2013). For 
example, exclusions of intangible assets are common, because their values are often subjective 
and certain components (such as goodwill) have low liquidation values (Holthausen and Watts, 
2001; Watts, 2003). Recent studies provide evidence consistent with debt markets’ demand for 
conditional conservatism (Ball et al., 2008b; Beatty et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008) and lending terms 
(both price and non-price related) are sometimes more favorable when firms have higher 
accounting quality (Bharath et al., 2008). 
                                                     
11 As noted by Christensen et al. (2016), incomplete contracting theory also recognizes that lenders, as well 
as borrowers, may behave opportunistically when holding decision rights. This perspective also points to a 
demand for independent verification of accounting data to determine where control lies, though this 
demand does not originate from lenders. 
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While conservatism may make accounting figures more suitable for contracting purposes, 
it may also be sub-optimal for control to shift to lenders where borrowers’ financial position is 
strong, because violations involve costly renegotiation. Li (2013) shows that renegotiation costs 
can be significant drivers of accounting characteristics in debt markets. Hence, while conservative 
accounting may produce contracting benefits, a sufficient number of Type 1 errors (false 
positives) may also be costly (Armstrong et al., 2010; Lambert, 2010).  
Demand for auditor assurance of covenant compliance may therefore originate in the 
negotiated measurement rules that adapt GAAP figures to make them more suitable for 
contracting. Although auditors are required to check compliance with covenants under the 
standard general purpose accounting regime, more complex accounting adjustments may involve 
more intensive monitoring when auditors face litigation risk from lenders.  
In summary, private lenders may place demands on auditors for assurance of covenant 
compliance in addition to the main audit report prepared as part of general purpose financial 
reporting. Furthermore, in theory, agency-based incentive problems and contracting efficiency 
may be improved by independent and effective monitoring of covenant compliance.  
Empirical research on auditors’ role in private lending arrangements is scarce. In a recent 
exception, Menon and Williams (2016) report that firms with higher credit risk are more likely to 
be required in their lending agreements to have an audit report free of going concern 
modifications and to have contractual clauses restricting their choice of auditor. Chen et al. 
(2016) find that firms with modified audit opinions (particularly going concern opinions) face 
punitive changes to the price and non-price terms of their debt, and that auditor opinions convey 
additional information to lenders about borrower risk.12 These studies do not investigate the 
                                                     
12 In a previous version of a paper studying covenants requiring borrowers to supply lenders with various 
kinds of private communications, Carrizosa and Ryan (2016) examine clauses where lenders require 
management letters from auditors (these typically relate to internal control deficiencies). Carrizosa and 
Ryan (2016) report associations consistent with the view that such clauses (along with the other private 
communication channels) enhance lenders’ monitoring of borrowers and compliance with loan contract 
terms. 
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extent to which auditors are obliged to provide lenders with independent assurance of borrowers’ 
compliance with accounting-based covenants. Our paper seeks to address this gap in the 
literature. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
Although our study is exploratory, we draw on prior theoretical and empirical research to 
develop our predictions.  Our first prediction is that lenders’ demand for audit will be higher 
where measurement rules for the accounting figures used in debt contracts depart more from the 
GAAP rules that auditors are already obliged to verify as part of their responsibilities to 
shareholders in the main audit.13 A long line of literature shows that debt contracts are based on 
tailored accounting rules (Armstrong et al., 2010), where the adjustments are designed to make 
accounting data more appropriate for contracting.14 Where modifications to GAAP are more 
extensive, we expect demand by lenders for additional covenant compliance assurance to be 
stronger.  This is because lenders are likely to seek confirmation that the negotiated rules, as well 
as the GAAP rules, have been adhered to by the borrower. Our first hypothesis, stated in 
alternative form, is therefore: 
H1: The presence of auditor covenant compliance assurance clauses is positively 
associated with the level of adjustments to GAAP in lending agreements. 
Our second prediction is that lenders’ demand for covenant compliance assurance will be 
an increasing function of the extent to which the lending agreement relies on accounting data, 
irrespective of the number of accounting adjustments. Reliance on accounting covenants is a 
distinctive feature of the private debt market (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012; Nini et al., 2012; 
Roberts and Sufi, 2009a) and while the vast majority of private debt contracts contain some 
                                                     
13 We are very grateful to the reviewer for suggesting this argument. 
14 There is extensive discussion in the literature about which measurement rules are appropriate for debt 
contracting. For instance, Li (2010) finds that stripping out transitory items is important, Li (2013) argues 
that conservatism is desirable, whereas Li (2016) reports that a focus on borrowers’ operations, rather than 
investing activities, influences the choice of accounting measurement rules. 
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accounting-based covenants (Nini et al., 2012), empirical research shows that the number can 
vary significantly.15 More extensive use of accounting in lending agreements is likely to require 
detailed information on borrowers’ internal accounting systems. Auditors are uniquely placed in 
having access to this information. 
In addition to financial covenants, performance pricing provisions based on accounting 
data are common in private debt contracts (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005; 2006; Ball et al., 2008a). 
These provisions may affect borrowers’ incentives to manipulate accounting figures (Armstrong 
et al., 2010). We therefore formulate the following alternative hypothesis, where the level of 
reliance on accounting data in our empirical analysis is measured by the number of financial 
covenants and the inclusion of accounting-based performance-pricing provisions in the lending 
agreement: 
H2: The presence of auditor covenant compliance assurance clauses is positively 
associated with the level of reliance on accounting data in the lending agreement. 
Our third prediction is that the demand for auditor covenant compliance assurance in 
private debt agreements will be higher when the valuation of assets is more subjective and when 
accounting data contain more ‘soft’ information (e.g. Watts, 2006). In our analysis, we capture 
this in two ways: the ratio of borrowers’ intangible assets to total assets and the book to market 
ratio. We expect information asymmetries to be more pronounced for intangible assets because 
active markets for these assets do not exist (e.g. Barth et al., 2001), making them difficult to 
verify and to value objectively (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Watts, 2006; Kothari et al., 2010). 
Moreover, disagreements in the valuation of intangible assets may arise between lenders and 
shareholders due to the information being used for different purposes by different capital 
provders (Kothari et al., 2010). This may lead to lenders attempting to monitor the measurement 
of intangibles via audit covenant checking requirements. Intangible assets are regularly excluded 
                                                     
15 Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) report that the number of performance covenants in a sample of over 
12,000 lending agreements ranges from zero to six. 
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from accounting covenants (Armstrong et al., 2010), but it can sometimes represent more 
efficient contracting for them to remain in contractual asset definitions (Frankel et al., 2008). 
Beatty et al. (2008) find that intangible assets are often kept in covenant definitions and even 
where they are excluded, this does not necessarily satisfy lenders’ demand for conservatism. Our 
third hypothesis is therefore: 
H3: The presence of auditor covenant compliance assurance clauses is positively 
associated with the level of intangibility of the borrower’s assets. 
Our fourth prediction focuses on the quality of monitoring by lenders, measured by the 
size of the loan syndicate. There is extensive evidence in the finance literature that free-riding in 
information gathering/monitoring tends to be higher when there are more lenders (Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2000; Esty and Megginson, 2003; Graham et al., 2008; Sufi, 2007; Kim et al., 2011; 
Lin et al., 2012).  As noted by Sufi (2007), moral hazard problems are exacerbated in syndicated 
loans, because uninformed participants delegate monitoring responsibilities to lead arrangers, 
whose effort is unobservable and whose incentives may not be clearly aligned with those of the 
other participants. Hence, larger syndicates imply a greater demand for assurance by auditors that 
borrowers are in compliance with accounting covenants. Based on these arguments, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
H4: The presence of auditor covenant compliance assurance clauses is positively 
associated with the number of lenders in the loan syndicate. 
Our fifth and final hypothesis relates to the maturity of the loan. Debt with shorter 
maturity is associated with reduced agency costs of debt because the firm’s financial position is 
less likely to deteriorate materially over shorter periods. Lenders may choose to issue loans that 
are repayable on demand or over shorter, fixed periods instead of providing longer term loans 
with covenants (Rajan and Winton, 1995; Datta et al., 2005). For loans with longer maturity, 
covenants represent the primary mechanism through which lenders are able to intervene over the 
life of the loan, making it more important to seek assurance that borrowers are in compliance. 
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Consistent with this line of argument, prior research finds that longer maturity debt requires more 
monitoring by auditors when reporting to shareholders (Gul and Goodwin, 2010) and to lenders 
(Menon and Williams, 2016).16 We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
H5: The presence of auditor covenant compliance assurance clauses is positively 
associated with loan maturity. 
An alternative explanation for the auditor clauses we observe is that they are ‘neutral 
mutations’, i.e., financial phenomena that serve no useful purpose but can persist indefinitely 
because they are benign (Miller, 1977). According to this view, however, we should observe no 
predictable associations between CCA clauses and the firm and loan characteristics covered by 
our discussion and hypotheses above. The following section outlines how we collect the data and 
constructed the measures used to test our predictions.  
 
4. Sample construction 
Our sample is based on data from three different sources. We begin by collecting data for 
all non-financial companies contained in the Compustat/CRSP annual database between 1996 and 
2012.  The starting year of 1996 is due to the need to obtain loan agreements from the SEC 
EDGAR system, which commenced collecting data in earnest in 1996 (Roberts and Sufi, 2009b). 
We collect data on lending agreements from Dealscan for the same period and use the 
Compustat-Dealscan link file (August 2012 version) provided by Chava and Roberts (2008) to 
form the common sample between these two sources.  
In order to collect data on auditor covenant compliance assurance clauses (which are not 
recorded by Dealscan), we develop a Perl algorithm to identify and search corporate lending 
agreements in the EDGAR archive.17 We first use the program to identify 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K 
                                                     
16 Though Menon and Williams (2016) examine the effect of loan maturity on going concern covenants and 
large (‘Big 4’) auditor clauses, rather than auditors’ monitoring of covenant compliance. 
17 We thank Andrew Leone for making his Perl code available for accessing the SEC data. 
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filings containing a loan contract, using the algorithm developed by Nini et al. (2009).18 We use 
Perl to obtain the date of the agreement from the contract because the date of filing with the SEC 
often bears little resemblance to the date the loan was initiated. 
We initially identify 16,258 agreements over our sample period (excluding financial 
companies).  When we merge this sample with the intersection of Compustat and Dealscan, we 
obtain 6,513 lending agreements.19 Because our initial sample is larger than the final sample, and 
because the appearance of firms in the Compustat/Dealscan intersection may not be random, 
where appropriate, we present descriptive statistics for both our initial and final samples. 
We obtain our main measure of lenders’ demand for audit by examining all lending 
agreements to identify auditors’ responsibility for independently verifying compliance with 
covenants. Specifically, we search contracts for cases where auditors are required to offer 
assurance that borrowers are in compliance with the accounting covenants. An example of an 
auditor CCA clause is provided below.20 
‘With each of the audited Financial Statements delivered pursuant to Section 5.2(a), 
a certificate of the independent certified public accountants that examined such 
statement to the effect that they have reviewed and are familiar with this Agreement 
and that, in examining such Financial Statements, they did not become aware of any 
fact or condition which then constituted a Default or Event of Default with respect to 
a financial covenant, except for those, if any, described in reasonable detail in such  
certificate.’ (Applica Inc., December 8th, 2001) 
 
                                                     
18 The procedure involves searching for terms such as ‘Credit Agreement’, ‘Loan Agreement’ etc., 
followed by the words ‘Table of Contents’ in upper case in the next 60 lines of the file. Nini et al. (2009) 
find this to be the procedure that reduces the number of false positives in EDGAR. 
19 We start our sample with 21,848 deals at the intersection of Dealscan-Compustat. After screening out 
duplicate observations and cases where we do not have all necessary variables for our analysis, this falls to 
18,120. Of these, we obtain a final sample of 6,513 deals with full data and a loan agreement in EDGAR. 
This proportion is comparable to that obtained by Nini et al. (2009). When they examine a random sample 
of 200 unmatched observations, Nini et al. (2009) find that 41% of the unmatched observations appear in 
EDGAR, but typically do not contain a table of contents (which is an essential part of the search algorithm 
used), 23% are minor amendments to existing contracts considered by Dealscan as new loans, while for 
37%, there is no contract in EDGAR, indicating that Dealscan obtains details directly from the parties 
arranging the loan. Importantly, after comparing observations matched and unmatched to EDGAR loan 
agreements, Nini et al. (2009) conclude that their data collection process does not result in any meaningful 
bias. 
20 Appendix B provides more examples of auditor clauses. 
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Importantly, in the absence of such clauses, a covenant compliance letter is still required, 
but is provided by the CEO or CFO without independent assurance by the auditor, as illustrated in 
the following example: 
‘Borrower shall provide … a copy of the annual audited financial statements… 
together with a certificate of the chief financial officer, principal accounting officer 
or chief executive officer of Borrower, in the form of the Compliance Certificate, 
stating that, as of the date of such certificate, to the best of his knowledge, after 
reasonable inquiry, no event has occurred which constitutes a Default or an Event of 
Default, or, if a Default or an Event of Default has occurred and is continuing, a 
statement as to the nature thereof’ (Atricure Inc., July 1st, 2008) 
 
To identify and assess the nature of auditor CCA clauses, we first hand-collected and read 
250 lending agreements. Based on this process, we developed a regular expression to automate 
our search. The regular expression is designed to capture cases where auditors are required to 
provide assurance of borrowers’ compliance with covenants to lenders.21 
For our additional analysis, we also developed a text search algorithm to identify Big 4 
auditor clauses by searching for the names of the Big 4 (and their ‘Big N’ counterparts before 
they merged). To ensure the accuracy of our automated procedures, we hand-collected and 
checked a random sample of 200 lending agreements. The results of this process showed the code 
to be correct for 89% of both the auditor CCA clauses and auditor name clauses.22  This compares 
favorably with prior research using text search programs on debt contracts (e.g. Nini et al., 2009; 
Nini et al., 2012). 
In order to assess the relationship between auditor clauses and different measurement 
rules (for H1), we next developed an algorithm to capture the extent of accounting-based 
adjustments to net income in the loan agreements. We focus on income-based covenants, since 
these are the most commonly occurring covenants in private lending agreements (Li, 2010; 
                                                     
21 Full details of the search algorithm are available from the authors on request. 
22 When the program does not identify a CCA in the contract, we assume that compliance with the 
covenants is certified only by an appropriate officer of the borrower, such as chief financial officer or chief 
executive officer. Our checking of 200 randomly chosen contracts showed that the error rate of 11% was 
almost entirely due to cases where the contract did contain a CCA, but the program failed to identify it; that 
is, in almost all (98%) cases, the CCA = 0 classification was accurate.  
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Christensen et al., 2016). This program identifies the beginning and end of the contractual 
definitions of both net income and EBITDA and records the number words in the definitions, 
together with the number of separate accounting adjustments required (proxied by the number of 
times a single letter or number - Arabic or Roman - appears in the net income definition). 
The measures for both net income and EBITDA definitions are aggregated in order to 
form an overall measure of the complexity of the adjustments that auditors have to check when 
signing the covenant compliance assurance letter. Li (2010) reports that net income appears either 
directly or indirectly in contracts through the use of EBITDA. An examination of the definitions 
in our sample of contracts revealed that the basis for EBITDA is typically ‘adjusted net income’ 
rather than GAAP net income. Auditors therefore have to provide assurance of compliance with 
covenants after assessing both adjusted net income and EBITDA. We manually checked a sample 
of 100 contracts and this procedure confirmed that the program is reasonably accurate. The 
correlation between the actual number of words in the contractual adjusted net income/EBITDA 
definitions and the number counted by the Perl program was 0.84.23 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Empirical model 
Our main analysis of lenders’ demand for audit is based on the following regression 
model, where all variables are defined in Appendix A: 
CCA_CLAUSEit = α0 +β1ADJ_COMPLEX + β2INTANGIBILITYit-1 + β3lnSYN_SIZEit + 
β4PERF_PRICEit + β5MATURITYit + β6DIVIDENDit-1 + β7ROAit-1 + 
β8NUM_COVit + β9LEVERAGEit-1 + β10BOOK_MKTit-1 + β11SPREADit + 
β12lnFAC_AMTit + β13lnMVALit-1 + β14REVOLVERit + β15CURRENTit-1 + 
β16Z_SCOREit-1 + β17SP_RATEDt + β18SECUREDit + year + industry + εit  
                                                     
23 Manual checking of the data revealed that, in a small number of cases, the program was not able to 
identify the end of the definition of adjusted net income/EBITDA. We therefore winsorised the raw data at 
the 99th percentile. Furthermore, because we expect the impact of more complex definitions to diminish as 
the length of the text describing the adjustments increases, we use the natural log of the number of words in 
the net income/EBITDA definitions. Our main conclusions are unaffected by using raw values, or by 
confining our analysis to values with a reasonable maximum number of words in the net income/EBITDA 




CCA_CLAUSE is our primary measure of audit demand and is set to 1 if the auditor is 
required to report to lenders on the compliance certificate provided by the borrower to lenders, 
and 0 otherwise. We use two measures of the complexity of the adjustments to GAAP 
(ADJ_COMPLEX). The first is the natural log of the number of words used to define the income-
based measure in the contract (EBITDA_WDS); the second is the number of clauses (i.e., separate 
instances of numerals or letters appearing in parentheses) in the same definition (EBITDA_ADJ). 
Our main models include a vector of control variables drawn from prior literature, as well as time 
and industry fixed effects. 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our final sample. The table shows that 35% of 
lending agreements include a CCA clause requiring the borrower’s auditor to provide lenders 
with assurance of borrowers’ compliance with covenants. The remaining 65% of lending 
agreements still require a letter of covenant compliance from the borrower (i.e., when 
CCA_CLAUSE = 0), though this is to be signed only by company officers and not by auditors 
(see the examples provided in Appendix B and in Taylor and Sansone, 2007; p. 302). Table 1 also 
reveals that over half (52%) of the agreements contain a Big 4 auditor clause.   
Table 1 reports the distribution of departures from GAAP in net income/EBITDA 
covenant definitions. The median and maximum for EBITDA_WDS are 4.78 and 7.33 
respectively.  These translate into a median of 119 words and a maximum of 1,531 words in 
defining contractual net income and EBITDA. The mean (median) number of adjustments 
(EBITDA_ADJ) is 5.18 (4). These figures indicate that the differences between contractual net 
income measures and GAAP net income are quite substantial. 
Insert table 1 about here 
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The average loan facility in our sample is for $356m, maturing at 44 months with 8 
lenders. These figures are broadly comparable with those reported by Nini et al. (2012). Average 
total assets and market values are $3,414m and $3,179m respectively, while 41% of the lending 
agreements in our sample contain accounting-based performance pricing features. The ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets (INTANGIBILITY) has a mean of 0.16, ranging from zero to 0.91 
and the mean spread over the relevant base rate is 1.87%. 
Table 2 Panel A shows that, inter alia, contracts containing an auditor CCA clause 
include income measures that depart more significantly from GAAP, relate to smaller loans, have 
longer maturity and are more likely to include accounting-based performance pricing provisions.  
Borrowers with CCA clauses are typically smaller (TOTAL ASSETS and MKT_VAL), have higher 
leverage, have a higher proportion of intangible assets (INTANGIBILITY) and are less likely to 
have their debt rated. 
Insert table 2 about here 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the use of auditor CCA clauses by the top ten lead arrangers 
(when ranked by aggregate funds arranged over our sample period). This evidence reveals 
widespread variation in the reliance on auditor covenant compliance assurance clauses across 
different lenders. Hence, CCA clauses are not concentrated among particular banks and there is 
significant variation in their usage within banks. 
Panels C and D of Table 2 show the distribution of CCA clauses across the Fama-French 
industries in our final (n = 6,513) and initial (n = 16,258) samples, respectively. Both samples 
indicate that while there is some variation, the proportion of contracts with a CCA clause is 
comparatively stable across industries. The exception is utilities, where the incidence is lower.  
Figure 1 (Graphs A and B) shows that CCA_CLAUSE follows a similar pattern over time in both 
our initial sample and in our final sample, though it is more volatile in our final sample, and lower 
in both samples in more recent years. 
Insert figure 1 about here 
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Figure 2 shows how the average levels of adjustments to GAAP net income vary over 
time. Both the average number of words and the number of clauses have increased - from 2.1 
(1.9) in 1996 to 3.97 (7.1) in 2012 for the mean log of the number of words (mean number of 
adjustments). This may reflect lenders’ dissatisfaction with the recent changes to GAAP that are 
reported to have made accounting less suitable for contracting (Demerjian, 2011; Ball et al., 
2015).24 
Insert figure 2 and table 3 about here 
Table 3 reports the correlations between the variables included in our models. Most 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.  The largest coefficients in absolute terms 
relate principally to firm and facility size and loan spread. Auditor CCA clauses are, inter alia, 
positively correlated with the departures of accounting measurement rules from GAAP, the 
propensity to require Big 4 auditors in the contract, loan maturity, the number of covenants, the 
level of intangibility, syndicate size, loan spread and the use of accounting-based performance 
pricing terms. 
 
5.3 Cross sectional analysis of covenant compliance assurance clauses 
Table 4 presents our main regression results for the cross-sectional determinants of 
CCA_CLAUSE.  CCA_CLAUSE takes a value of 1 where auditors are required to provide 
assurance of borrowers’ compliance with the financial covenants and 0 otherwise. All models 
have large values of Wald χ2 statistics, which offers overall evidence to reject a null hypothesis 
that CCA clauses are ‘neutral mutations’.25 Columns (1) and (2) report results based on a pooled 
                                                     
24 The simultaneous increase in the complexity of the adjustments and fall in the use of CCA clauses in 
recent years may seem inconsistent with our H1. However, there is also a fall in the average number of 
covenants in our sample over time (from 2.53 in 1996 to 1.46 in 2012), in line with Ball et al. (2015). 
25 Strictly, a model including only time effects could allow CCA clauses to represent neutral mutations. All 
our models include time-fixed effects. 
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logit regression, whereas columns (3) and (4) are based on random effects logit regression.26 
Models in columns (1) - (4) include industry and year fixed effects, while columns (5) and (6) 
report estimates for models with lead arranger fixed-effects. 
Insert table 4 about here 
Column (1) of Table 4 reveals that the level of complexity of the income measure used in 
the contract – EBITDA_WDS, measured as the natural log of the number of words in the 
contractual net income/EBITDA definition – is strongly and positively associated with lenders’ 
demand for auditor assurance of borrowers’ covenant compliance (z = 8.13). Column (2) shows 
that the coefficient estimate for our alternative measure of complexity of adjustments 
(EBITDA_ADJ) is also significant and positive at p = 0.001. These results are consistent with H1 
and support the idea that more complicated measurement rules are associated with the existence 
of CCA clauses.27 The extent to which accounting data feature in the contract – measured by the 
number of covenants and the use of accounting-based performance pricing – is also significantly 
positive at p = 0.05 (NUM_COV) and p = 0.01 (PERF_PRICE). This result is consistent with H2.  
Columns (1) and (2) show that INTANGIBILITY is significantly and positively associated 
with the existence of a CCA clause, consistent with a need to provide lenders with higher levels 
of verifiability of intangible asset values. This offers support for H3. Table 4 also presents limited 
evidence (in column (1) at p < 0.10) that firms with higher book to market ratios are less likely to 
have auditors provide lenders with assurance on covenant compliance. Although the evidence is 
not as strong, it is consistent with the results on the intangibility of assets and suggests that 
                                                     
26 A fixed-effects logit estimator is unsuitable in our study because the time-invariant nature of 
CCA_CLAUSE leads to our sample being decimated (e.g., see Lennox et al., 2013, footnote 30). However, 
the stronger results in the random effects models - which partially control for time-invariant company 
specific effects - suggests that our inability to estimate fixed effects models is not a major concern. 
27 In additional unreported analysis (available from the authors on request), we examined the impact of the 
contract using GAAP-based net income definitions by including a dummy variable, which indicates 
whether (1) or not (0) the contract included any adjustments (i.e., where EBITDA_WDS > 0 compared with 
EBITDA_WDS = 0). This results in a coefficient estimate (odds ratio) of 0.653 (1.92) with a z-statistic of 
7.66, suggesting that the probability of a CCA clause being included when there are departures from GAAP 
is around twice as high as when GAAP net income figures are used. 
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lenders to firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to require additional auditor 
assurance. 
The results in each of columns (1) - (4) in Table 4 suggest that larger loan syndicates are 
significantly more likely to require auditors to provide assurance of covenant compliance at p < 
0.01.  Hence, regardless of the estimator used, the coefficient for lnSYN_SIZE is consistently 
positive and significantly different from zero. This is consistent with H4 that less diligent 
monitoring due to large syndicates may be reduced by engaging independent auditors to assure 
lenders of covenant compliance.  
Overall, for H1-H5, the standard logit results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 
are reinforced by the random effects logit estimates in columns (3) and (4). The exceptions are 
the book to market ratio (BOOK_MKT), loan maturity (MATURITY) and accounting-based 
performance-pricing (PERF_PRICE), with the latter two being significant at p = 0.05 with the 
random effects estimator. Columns (5) and (6) confirm that our results are not driven by auditor 
assurance clauses being part of ‘boilerplate’ contracts written by particular banks: including lead 
arranger fixed effects does not affect our main inferences.28 
In untabulated analyses, we quantify the economic effects implied by the results in Table 
4. When all predictors are set to their means, the probability of a contract containing a 
CCA_CLAUSE is 34%. Holding all other variables at their means, the predicted probability of the 
lending agreement containing a CCA clause increases substantially from 24% to 40% as 
EBITDA_WDS increases from the 25th percentile (which is 0 words) to the 75th percentile (280 
words). Moving from the 25th to 75th percentiles for INTANGIBILITY (lnSYN_SIZE) increases the 
probability of having a CCA clause from 31% (from 29%) to 35% (to 38%).  The corresponding 
                                                     
28 The positive and significant parameter estimates for SPREAD are interesting, as noted by the reviewer. 
Higher interest rates may reflect lenders’ private information on higher levels of borrowers’ risk, which are 
likely to be associated with more covenant compliance checking by auditors. Consistent with this, the 
coefficient on LEVERAGE becomes statistically significant and larger when SPREAD is removed from 
some of our specifications. Hence, the effects of LEVERAGE seem to be incorporated into SPREAD. None 
of our other inferences are changed when we estimate the models without SPREAD. 
 23 
increases for NUM_COV and MATURITY are 32%-34% and 32%-36%, respectively. These 
statistics indicate that the predictors in our main model have material effects on the probability 
that the lending agreement contains a CCA clause. 
 
5.4 Simultaneous estimation of auditor demand with Big 4 auditor clauses 
Recent research by Menon and Williams (2016) indicates that lenders’ demand for audit 
is reflected in clauses that restrict borrowers’ choice of auditor on the basis that larger (Big 4) 
auditors are more accurate and more able to compensate lenders in the event of litigation. In order 
to allow for simultaneous demand for covenant compliance assurance and clauses that restrict 
auditor choice, in Table 5, we estimate CCA_CLAUSE and BIG4_CLAUSE models 
simultaneously, using a bivariate probit estimator. This allows for any conditional correlation 
between the residuals of both models. 
Insert table 5 about here 
The primary conclusions we draw from the results in Table 5 are that the residuals are 
correlated across the CCA_CLAUSE and BIG4_CLAUSE equations (rho is positive and 
significant at p < 0.01) but that our main inferences are unchanged when this cross-correlation is 
allowed for.29 The coefficients for both EBITDA_WDS and EBITDA_ADJ remain significant and 
positive at p < 0.01 in all models. The coefficient for INTANGIBILITY is significantly different 
from zero at p < 0.05 in the CCA_CLAUSE equation, but is not significantly different from zero 
in the Big 4 model (column (2)), suggesting that higher levels of intangible assets manifest 
themselves in stronger demand for assurance of covenant compliance, but not for auditor-
restriction clauses. Moreover, the use of accounting-based performance pricing measures remains 
positively associated with the use of CCA clauses, but is negatively associated with auditor 
                                                     
29 We also conducted an extended analysis of auditor Big ‘N’ clauses by studying a wider set of audit firms 
(i.e., the top 30 firms in each year of our sample). The results of this analysis (available on request) are 
substantively the same as those using only the Big 4 audit firms. 
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restriction clauses.30 The coefficient for lnSYN_SIZE is significant at p < 0.01 in all models. 
Overall, Table 5 shows that our main inferences are unchanged when audit demand is 
simultaneously estimated with the auditor restriction clauses reported in Menon and Williams 
(2016) and that our results are robust to measuring private lenders’ audit demand using Big 4 
auditor clauses. 
 
5.5 Effects of excluding intangibles from covenant definitions 
Prior research shows that where intangible assets are inconvenient for contracting parties, 
it is common to exclude them from accounting definitions (Leftwich, 1983; Holthausen and 
Watts, 2001).  Even where covenant definitions do not explicitly exclude intangibles, not all ratios 
are affected by movements in the values of intangible assets in either the balance sheet or income 
statement. This is the case for the debt to EBITDA ratio, for example, which is a very common 
covenant, featuring in around 60% of contracts in our sample. We therefore split our sample 
according to whether the covenants in the contract are affected by changes in the value of 
intangible assets. Specifically, we identified three types of covenants that are affected by 
movements in the values of intangible assets: maximum debt to equity, minimum equity to assets, 
and net worth.  
If auditor assurance of compliance with covenants is more important where firms’ assets 
are harder to verify and/or when there is likely to be more disagreement between lenders and 
shareholders over the value of intangibles, we expect the effect of INTANGIBILITY on the 
presence of CCA clauses to be more pronounced when the contract contains at least one covenant 
affected by the values of intangible assets. The results are presented in Table 6. 
Insert table 6 about here 
                                                     
30 The negative association between accounting-based performance pricing and Big 4 auditor restriction 
clauses is somewhat puzzling. One potential explanation is that companies with performance pricing based 
on accounting variables rather than bond ratings are typically smaller (because smaller companies are less 
likely to have bond ratings) and smaller firms are less likely to employ a Big 4 audit firm - and hence to 
have clauses restricting their auditor choice to the Big 4. 
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Our sample includes 1,171 contracts containing at least one covenant affected by the 
value of intangible assets (i.e., where INTAN_COV = 1). The vast majority (5,342) therefore 
contain covenants that are unaffected by intangible asset values, or have no covenants at all. 
Table 6 reports a coefficient estimate of INTANGIBILITY that is positive and significant at p = 
0.10 for both samples, but is twice as large (0.914 versus 0.453) when covenant definitions are 
affected by intangible asset values. These results are consistent with the idea that auditor 
assurance of covenant compliance in debt contracts facilitates the inclusion of assets that are 
difficult to verify and/or may result in valuation disparities between capital providers, and may 
act as an alternative to the exclusion of such assets.31 To the extent that these assets may be 
relevant to lenders (Lambert, 2010), but are regarded as less reliable for contracting purposes 
(Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Watts, 2003; Kothari et al., 2010), auditor covenant compliance 
assurance clauses potentially represent an efficient contracting mechanism. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We investigate the demand for additional auditor assurance in private lending 
agreements. Our measure of demand is whether auditors are contractually required to report to 
lenders on borrowers’ compliance with the financial covenants in the lending agreement. The 
clauses we examine have been identified in isolated cases in prior research (Watts, 1977; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986), but to date, they have not been subjected to systematic empirical 
investigation. 
Auditors are required to check borrowers’ compliance under the GAAP regime regardless 
of the contractual provisions we study. Auditing standards for covenant compliance assurance 
                                                     
31 These differences are economically significant based on our estimates. Moving from the 25th to 
75th percentiles for INTANGIBILITY when INTAN_COV = 0 (INTAN_COV = 1) increases the probability of 
having a CCA clause from 30.2% (from 36.9%) to 32.6% (to 43.0%). Although the ratio of coefficients of 
roughly 2:1 is comparatively high, we caution against attaching too much significance to the difference 
between the coefficients and we do not test it statistically. Testing for differences between groups in logit 
regressions is a contentious issue in the statistics literature (e.g. Mood, 2010), and the standard errors of the 
individual parameters are relatively large, so any difference is likely to be marginal in statistical terms.  
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state that auditors are only to offer negative assurance to lenders and do not increase their work as 
a result of such obligations. On the other hand, by requiring reports be addressed to lenders, 
covenant compliance clauses are likely to increase auditors’ litigation risk from lenders. 
Furthermore, agency theory and the financial contracting literature suggest that lenders’ demand 
for covenant compliance assurance where auditors report directly to them should vary in a 
predictable way. 
We develop and test hypotheses relating to factors likely to be associated with auditor 
covenant compliance assurance clauses. Our results indicate that auditors play an important role 
in reducing information asymmetries and enhancing contracting efficiency. Consistent with 
conjectures in prior research (Li, 2010), more complex adjustments to GAAP measurement rules 
are associated with increased requirements for monitoring by auditors. While we leave the 
investigation of the specific costs of extra monitoring to future research, it is possible that the 
additional assurance required for tailored measurement rules may help explain why debt contracts 
contain comparatively few (and relatively simple) financial covenants (Christensen et al., 2016).  
Our results show that additional assurance of compliance is more common for firms with 
high levels of intangible assets. When covenants are affected by movements in intangible asset 
values, our results provide some support for the idea that auditors are more likely to be engaged 
to report to lenders on borrowers’ compliance. These findings may help reconcile apparently 
contradictory reports in the literature that intangible assets are problematic for contracting 
purposes, yet they often remain in covenant definitions (cf. Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Kothari 
et al., 2010; Watts, 2003 and Frankel et al., 2008).  
Larger loan syndicates are associated with higher levels of audit assurance, consistent 
with auditors being engaged to compensate for lower quality monitoring quality when there are 
more participants in the transaction (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Esty and Megginson, 2003; 
Graham et al., 2008; Sufi, 2007; Kim et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2012). We also find that auditor 
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assurance of covenant compliance is positively associated with loan maturity and the level of 
reliance on accounting data in the contract.  
Overall, these findings are more consistent with predictions from agency theory and 
contracting theory that CCA clauses represent an important and useful contracting device rather 
than ‘neutral mutations’ (Miller, 1977) that have no economic content but which remain in 
contracts because they do no harm. 
 Our results remain vulnerable to the criticism that contractual features are decided 
simultaneously, so we cannot infer causality from our models. Although our focus has been on 
identifying potential antecedents of additional reporting to lenders, other plausible relationships 
may explain the positive associations we observe. One such relationship is where features of the 
lending agreement (e.g. loan maturity and syndicate size) may be dependent on the accounting 
covenants in the contract being checked by auditors. It is also possible that other factors are 
simultaneously associated with the level of complexity of tailored measurement rules and demand 
for auditor covenant compliance assurance. 
 Future research could examine whether auditor covenant compliance assurance acts as a 
substitute for, or complement to, other accounting and corporate governance mechanisms and 
characteristics. Such research would contribute to the growing body of evidence on debt 
providers’ role in shaping corporate governance in general (Triantis and Daniels, 1995; Nini et 
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Figure 1. Auditor covenant compliance assurance clauses over time 
This figure illustrates the proportion of lending agreements containing a CCA clause. Graph A reports the 
proportion of contracts in each year with a CCA clause for our initial SEC sample (n = 16,258). Our initial 
sample comprises lending agreements identified by a text search program from the SEC 10-K, 10-Q and 8-
K archives for 5,801 firms between 1996 and 2012. Graph B reports the proportion of contracts with a 
CCA clause for our final sample (n = 6,513). Our final sample comprises all lending agreements in our 
initial sample with data available for all necessary variables in Dealscan and Compustat. 
 
 












Figure 2. Modifications to GAAP in income definitions over time 
This figure illustrates the average levels of modifications to GAAP in private lending agreements filed with 
the SEC in Form 10-K, 10-Q or 8-K between 1996 and 2012. Graph A reports the average (log) number of 
words in the contractual definition of adjusted net income and EBITDA. Graph B shows the average 
number of separate clauses in contractual definitions of adjusted net income and EBITDA. Both graphs are 
based on our final sample (n = 6,513). 
 
 





Graph B: Number of clauses in contractual income definitions  
 
   
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
(n = 6,513) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
CCA_CLAUSE 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
BIG4_CLAUSE 0.52 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 
EBITDA_WDS 3.56 2.58 4.78 0.00 7.33 
EBITDA_ADJ 5.18 5.94 4.00 0.00 41.00 
INTANGIBILITY 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.91 
SYN_SIZE 8.27 7.97 6.00 1.00 141 
MATURITY (mths) 44.12 20.43 48.00 1.00 252 
NUM_COV 2.26 1.37 2.00 0.00 7.00 
SPREAD (basis pts) 187.13 134.06 175.00 4.40 1450 
FAC_AMT ($m) 356.05 947.66 150.00 0.14 30,000 
REVOLVER 0.81 0.39 1.00 0.00 1.00 
SECURED 0.57 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 
PERF_PRICE 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TOTAL ASSETS ($m) 3,414 10,284 748 1.27 275,644 
MKT_VAL ($m) 3,179 9,784 638 0.00 251,170 
ROA 0.02 0.11 0.04 -0.55 0.24 
LEVERAGE 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.91 
BOOK_MKT 0.53 1.02 0.47 -6.27 4.16 
DIVIDEND 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 
CURRENT 1.95 1.22 1.67 0.31 7.75 
Z_SCORE 3.54 3.18 2.88 -2.11 20.95 
SP_RATED 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the final sample included in our main regression models. The sample includes 
lending agreements identified by a text search program from the SEC archives for 2,819 firms between 1996 and 2012 
with data in Dealscan and Compustat. 
EBITDA_WDS, ROA, LEVERAGE, Z_SCORE, DIVIDEND, BOOK_MKT and CURRENT are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics on Auditor Clauses 
Panel A: Means classified by Auditor Covenant Compliance Assurance (CCA) Clause Samples 
 (3) 
Contracts with a CCA 
clause 
(n =2,275 ) 
(4) 
Contracts without a CCA 
clause 





 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t 
EBITDA_WDS 4.17 2.34 3.23 2.64 -14.17*** 
EBITDA_ADJ 6.23 6.08 4.62 5.78 -10.51*** 
INTANGIBILITY 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.18 -5.15*** 
SYN_SIZE 8.24 7.80 8.29 8.06 0.21 
MATURITY (mths) 46.71 18.94 42.73 21.05 -7.53*** 
NUM_COV 2.56 1.35 2.10 1.36 -13.08*** 
SPREAD (basis pts) 199.66 126.06 180.41 137.70 -5.54*** 
FAC_AMT ($m) 252.16 404 411.82 1133.03 6.50*** 
REVOLVER 0.85 0.36 0.79 0.41 -6.32*** 
SECURED 0.64 0.48 0.53 0.50 -8.74*** 
PERF_PRICE 0.52 0.50 0.36 0.48 -12.76*** 
TOTAL ASSETS ($m) 1,854 3,885 4,251 12,346 9.02*** 
MKT_VAL ($m) 1,716 3,655 3,964 11,755 8.89*** 
ROA 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.49 
LEVERAGE 0.25 0.20 0.23 0.19 -4.66*** 
BOOK_MKT 0.52 1.05 0.54 1.00 1.08 
DIVIDEND 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 4.21*** 
CURRENT 2.00 1.24 1.92 1.21 -2.56*** 
Z_SCORE 3.50 3.10 3.57 3.22 0.81 
SP_RATED 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.50 4.22*** 
Panel B: Distribution of CCA clauses by Top 10 Lead Arranger  
 Contracts with a CCA 
clause  
Contracts without a 
CCA clause  Total 
 n % n % n 
Bank of America 414 33.5% 820 66.5% 1,234 
Barclays 6 15.0% 34 85.0% 40 
BNP Paribas 8 17.0% 39 83.0% 47 
Citi 127 23.6% 410 76.4% 537 
Credit Suisse  67 48.9% 70 51.1% 137 
Deutsche Bank 61 53.0% 54 47.0% 115 
JP Morgan 225 43.8% 289 56.2% 514 
Mitsubishi UFJ 0 0.0% 2 100.0% 2 
RBS 6 17.1% 29 82.9% 35 
Wells Fargo  83 24.5% 256 75.5% 339 
Total 997 33.2% 2,003 66.8% 3,000 
 Table 2 (continued) 
Panel C: Distribution of CCA clauses across Industries in Final Sample (n = 6,513) 
 N % of 
sample 
% with a CCA 
clause 
Consumer Non-Durables  541 8.31 41.04 
Consumer Durables  232 3.56 40.52 
Manufacturing 1035 15.89 37.00 
Oil, Gas, and Coal 514 7.89 29.77 
Chemicals and Allied Products 229 3.52 29.26 
Business Equipment 868 13.33 33.06 
Telephone and Television Transmission 259 3.98 37.45 
Utilities 294 4.51 21.09 
Wholesale and Retail 1045 16.04 34.93 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drug 463 7.11 34.13 
Other (excluding Financial) 1033 15.86 37.46 
Total 6,513 100 34.93 
Panel D: Distribution of CCA clauses across Industries in Initial SEC Sample (n = 16,258) 
 N % of 
sample 
% with a CCA 
clause 
Consumer Non-Durables  1129 6.94 36.85 
Consumer Durables  529 3.25 38.75 
Manufacturing 2218 13.64 35.62 
Oil, Gas, and Coal 1200 7.38 27.92 
Chemicals and Allied Products 474 2.92 29.11 
Business Equipment 1714 10.54 28.82 
Telephone and Television Transmission 868 5.34 38.36 
Utilities 1081 6.65 18.22 
Wholesale and Retail 2419 14.88 33.69 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drug 1072 6.59 30.88 
Other (excluding Financial) 3554 21.86 30.98 
Total 16,258 100 31.71 
This table presents various summary statistics on auditor clauses contained in private lending agreements. 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for lending agreements with and without an auditor covenant 
compliance assurance clause (CCA_CLAUSE). 
CCA_CLAUSE indicates whether the loan agreement contains a clause requiring the auditor to assure 
lenders of borrowers’ compliance with the loan covenants. 
Panel B shows the distribution of CCA_CLAUSE across the top arrangers in the syndicated loan market, 
where top arrangers are identified by the amount lent during our sample period according to historical 
league tables provided by Thomson One. Note that Panel B presents only the subsample of our data with a 
lead arranger classified as a ‘top arranger’.    
Panel C presents proportions of lending agreements with CCA clauses across Fama-French industries 
(excluding finance) for the final sample included in our main regression models. This sample includes 
6,513 lending agreements identified by a text search program from SEC Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K for 
2,819 firms between 1996 and 2012 and with the necessary data in Dealscan and Compustat. 
Panel D presents proportions of CCA clauses across Fama-French industries for our initial sample of 
16,258 lending agreements for 5,801 firms between 1996 and 2012. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
   
 
  
 Table 3 
Correlation Matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1-CCA_CLAUSE 1          
2-BIG4_CLAUSE 0.094*** 1         
3-EBITDA_ADJ 0.129*** 0.086*** 1        
4-EBITDA_WDS 0.173*** 0.097*** 0.754*** 1       
5-INTANGIBILITY 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.196*** 0.180*** 1      
6-lnSYN_SIZE 0.021* 0.221*** 0.063*** 0.031** 0.133*** 1     
7-PERF_PRICE 0.156*** -0.002 0.170*** 0.241*** 0.123*** 0.028** 1    
8-MATURITY 0.093*** 0.077*** 0.174*** 0.171*** 0.118*** 0.192*** 0.259*** 1   
9-DIVIDEND -0.052*** 0.076*** -0.076*** -0.116*** -0.02 0.168*** -0.090*** -0.031** 1  
10-ROA -0.006 0.067*** 0.005 0.026** 0.023* 0.219*** 0.156*** 0.109*** 0.216*** 1 
11-NUM_COV 0.160*** 0.021* 0.101*** 0.228*** 0.028** -0.070*** 0.447*** 0.086*** -0.158*** 0.037*** 
12-LEVERAGE 0.058*** 0.082*** 0.057*** 0.020 0.080*** 0.130*** -0.009 0.088*** -0.067*** -0.167*** 
13-BOOK_MKT -0.013 -0.052*** -0.037*** -0.011 -0.016 -0.061*** 0.016 -0.011 -0.044*** 0.086*** 
14-SPREAD 0.068*** -0.091*** 0.181*** 0.138*** 0.001 -0.345*** -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.235*** -0.390*** 
15-lnFAC_AMT -0.071*** 0.201*** 0.039*** -0.022* 0.089*** 0.755*** -0.125*** 0.147*** 0.216*** 0.223*** 
16-lnMVAL -0.091*** 0.185*** 0.003 -0.061*** 0.140*** 0.605*** -0.119*** 0.039*** 0.292*** 0.370*** 
17-REVOLVER 0.078*** -0.040*** 0.115*** 0.164*** 0.02 -0.065*** 0.224*** 0.372*** -0.094*** -0.006 
18-CURRENT 0.032** -0.062*** 0.026** 0.053*** -0.057*** -0.176*** 0.131*** 0.054*** -0.050*** 0.105*** 
19-Z_SCORE -0.010 -0.029** 0.011 0.037*** -0.044*** -0.049*** 0.143*** 0.006 0.109*** 0.434*** 
20-SP_RATED -0.052*** 0.179*** 0.001 -0.079*** 0.081*** 0.467*** -0.260*** 0.017 0.147*** 0.021* 
21-SECURED 0.108*** -0.097*** 0.156*** 0.159*** -0.018 -0.301*** 0.154*** 0.096*** -0.293*** -0.271*** 
  
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
11-NUM_COV 1           
12-LEVERAGE 0.045*** 1          
13-BOOK_MKT 0.025** -0.084*** 1         
14-SPREAD 0.089*** 0.168*** 0.018 1        
15-lnFAC_AMT -0.247*** 0.099*** -0.059*** -0.390*** 1       
16-lnMVAL -0.260*** -0.055*** -0.044*** -0.468*** 0.742*** 1      
17-REVOLVER 0.152*** -0.048*** 0.049*** 0.027** -0.141*** -0.229*** 1     
18-CURRENT 0.079*** -0.153*** 0.082*** -0.041*** -0.180*** -0.084*** 0.091*** 1    
19-Z_SCORE 0.029** -0.471*** -0.022* -0.266*** -0.039*** 0.204*** 0.029** 0.447*** 1   
20-SP_RATED -0.201*** 0.360*** -0.042*** -0.147*** 0.536*** 0.484*** -0.187*** -0.214*** -0.256*** 1  
21-SECURED 0.270*** 0.135*** 0.043*** 0.498*** -0.381*** -0.495*** 0.227*** 0.047*** -0.151*** -0.191*** 1 
This table reports Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the full sample of 6,513 lending agreements. *, **, *** denote statistically 
different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  
 Table 4 
Auditor Covenant Compliance Assurance (CCA) Clauses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












EBITDA_WDS 0.128***  0.270***  0.112***  
 (8.13)  (8.62)  (7.76)  
EBITDA_ADJ  0.040***  0.082***  0.041*** 
  (6.32)  (6.40)  (6.86) 
INTANGIBILITY 0.555** 0.583*** 1.267*** 1.243*** 0.377** 0.386** 
 (2.48) (2.60) (3.14) (3.11) (2.02) (2.15) 
BOOK_MKT -0.050* -0.047 -0.08 -0.071 -0.047 -0.044 
 (-1.70) (-1.60) (-1.46) (-1.34) (-1.60) (-1.53) 
lnSYN_SIZE 0.214*** 0.217*** 0.320*** 0.324*** 0.182*** 0.181*** 
 (4.42) (4.47) (3.78) (3.83) (3.44) (3.44) 
NUM_COV 0.058** 0.083*** 0.163*** 0.206*** 0.061*** 0.080*** 
 (2.07) (3.00) (3.05) (3.92) (2.75) (3.53) 
PERF_PRICE 0.253*** 0.276*** 0.302** 0.346** 0.245*** 0.244*** 
 (3.10) (3.35) (2.03) (2.35) (3.26) (3.22) 
MATURITY 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007** 0.007** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (3.38) (3.42) (2.10) (2.22) (2.94) (3.04) 
DIVIDEND 0.85 0.254 -2.618 -3.535 0.503 -0.129 
 (0.30) (0.09) (-0.51) (-0.71) (0.19) (-0.05) 
ROA 0.064 0.086 0.354 0.293 0.033 0.072 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.56) (0.47) (0.09) (0.20) 
LEVERAGE 0.241 0.237 0.164 0.205 0.378** 0.333* 
 (1.12) (1.10) (0.41) (0.52) (1.98) (1.76) 
SPREAD 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (3.76) (3.54) (3.06) (2.79) (2.87) (2.62) 
lnFAC_AMT -0.131*** -0.128*** -0.146* -0.146* -0.171*** -0.168*** 
 (-3.00) (-2.96) (-1.85) (-1.88) (-4.43) (-4.43) 
lnMVAL 0.017 0.011 0.035 0.031 -0.022 -0.032 
 (0.50) (0.32) (0.60) (0.54) (-0.55) (-0.76) 
REVOLVER 0.097 0.124 -0.056 -0.008 0.148* 0.169* 
 (1.06) (1.37) (-0.36) (-0.05) (1.67) (1.94) 
CURRENT 0.05 0.051 0.121** 0.118** 0.062** 0.062** 
 (1.55) (1.57) (2.06) (2.05) (2.23) (2.25) 
Z_SCORE -0.002 -0.002 -0.025 -0.022 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.91) (-0.82) (-0.01) (-0.04) 
SP_RATED -0.078 -0.096 -0.083 -0.138 -0.115 -0.133 
 (-0.81) (-0.99) (-0.47) (-0.77) (-1.25) (-1.47) 
SECURED 0.113 0.096 0.352** 0.317** 0.101 0.083 
 (1.34) (1.12) (2.30) (2.09) (1.57) (1.27) 
N 6,513 6,513 6,513 6,513 5,862 5,862 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Arranger fixed 
effects 
No No No No Yes Yes 
Wald χ2 324.73 309.11 249.30 236.30 611.01 618.18 
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table presents the coefficients from logistic regressions where the dependent variable is whether the loan agreement 
contained a clause requiring the audit firm to certify the borrower’s compliance with financial covenants (CCA_CLAUSE = 
1 when the clause contains an auditor covenant compliance assurance clause).  
*, **, *** Denote statistically different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
z- statistics based on firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Columns 1 and 2 are estimated via standard logit regression; Columns 3 and 4 are estimated using random effects panel 
logit regression; Columns 5 and 6 are estimated using conditional logit with lender fixed effects. 










Bivariate Probit Regression Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CCA Big4 CCA Big4 
EBITDA_WDS 0.077*** 0.074***   
 (8.15) (7.74)   
EBITDA_ADJ   0.025*** 0.025*** 
   (6.37) (6.64) 
INTANGIBILITY 0.337** 0.176 0.357*** 0.189 
 (2.46) (1.26) (2.60) (1.35) 
BOOK_MKT -0.031* -0.050*** -0.029 -0.048*** 
 (-1.70) (-2.71) (-1.60) (-2.63) 
lnSYN_SIZE 0.127*** 0.106*** 0.129*** 0.107*** 
 (4.38) (3.60) (4.45) (3.65) 
NUM_COV 0.036** 0.036** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 (2.10) (2.08) (3.06) (2.98) 
PERF_PRICE 0.155*** -0.121** 0.168*** -0.107** 
 (3.11) (-2.50) (3.36) (-2.23) 
MATURITY 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (3.32) (3.38) (3.38) (3.36) 
DIVIDEND 0.467 3.506** 0.147 3.200** 
 (0.27) (2.22) (0.09) (2.03) 
ROA 0.039 0.175 0.049 0.191 
 (0.20) (0.90) (0.25) (0.99) 
LEVERAGE 0.155 0.081 0.153 0.081 
 (1.18) (0.61) (1.17) (0.61) 
SPREAD 0.001*** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000** 
 (3.73) (2.32) (3.51) (2.08) 
lnFAC_AMT -0.076*** 0.040 -0.075*** 0.040 
 (-2.90) (1.50) (-2.87) (1.54) 
lnMVAL 0.011 0.087*** 0.006 0.082*** 
 (0.54) (4.34) (0.32) (4.13) 
REVOLVER 0.056 -0.031 0.072 -0.014 
 (1.03) (-0.59) (1.34) (-0.26) 
CURRENT 0.031 -0.013 0.031 -0.012 
 (1.61) (-0.71) (1.62) (-0.65) 
Z_SCORE -0.001 -0.016* -0.001 -0.016* 
 (-0.13) (-1.85) (-0.11) (-1.86) 
SP_RATED -0.051 0.157*** -0.061 0.145** 
 (-0.87) (2.70) (-1.04) (2.49) 
SECURED 0.066 -0.080 0.055 -0.089* 
 (1.27) (-1.53) (1.05) (-1.71) 
     
N 6513 6513 6513 6513 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
rho 0.122 0.131 
Wald test rho = 0 (16.477)*** (19.201)*** 
This table presents the coefficients from jointly estimated bivariate probit (biprobit) regressions. The dependent 
variable in Columns 1 and 3 is whether the loan agreement contained a clause requiring the audit firm to certify 
compliance with financial covenants (CCA_CLAUSE = 1 when the clause contains an auditor covenant compliance 
assurance clause). The dependent variable in Columns 2 and 4 indicate whether (BIG4_CLAUSE = 1) or not 
(BIG4_CLAUSE = 0) the loan agreement contained a clause requiring a Big 4 audit firm to audit the financial 
statements.  
 *, **, *** Denote statistically different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
z-statistics based on firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  
Table 6 
Effects of Intangibles being Excluded from Covenant Definitions 




INTANGIBILITY 0.914* 0.453* 
 (1.94) (1.88) 
N 1,171 5,342 
Control variables included Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Wald Chi-square 124.31*** 261.08*** 
Prob. > Chi-square 0.000 0.000 
This table presents the coefficients from logistic regressions where the dependent variable is whether the loan 
agreement contained a clause requiring the audit firm to certify the borrower’s compliance with financial covenants 
(CCA_CLAUSE = 1 when the agreement contains an auditor covenant compliance assurance clause). Columns 1 
and 2 report estimates for subsamples of agreements which either contain (INTAN_COV = 1) or do not contain 
(INTAN_COV = 0) a covenant which is affected by variation in the value (or change in value) of intangible assets.  
*, *** Denote statistically different from zero at the 0.10 and 0.01 levels, respectively. z- statistics based on firm-
clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  
 Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
CCA_CLAUSE 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the loan agreement contains an auditor covenant compliance 
assurance clause that requires the auditor to sign the borrower’s covenant compliance 
certificate, 0 otherwise. 
BIG4_CLAUSE 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the loan agreement contains a clause requiring a Big 4 audit firm 
to audit the annual financial statements, 0 otherwise. 
EBITDA_WDS 
The natural logarithm of the number of words used in the accounting adjustments in the 
lending agreement for the measurement of income. Words for both net income and EBITDA 
adjustments are counted and aggregated. 
EBITDA_ADJ 
The number of accounting adjustments in the lending agreement for the measurement of 
income counted by the number of clauses in the definitions. Clauses are counted where letters 
and/or (Arabic or Roman) numbers appear in parentheses in the definitions. Clauses 
appearing in the definitions of both net income and EBITDA adjustments are counted and 
aggregated. 
INTANGIBILITY 
Intangible assets divided by total assets. Observations with missing values for intangible 
assets are set to zero. 
lnSYN_SIZE The natural log of the number of lenders in the lending syndicate. 
PERF_PRICE 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan agreement contains a performance pricing 
arrangement based on accounting data, 0 otherwise. 
MATURITY Loan maturity (in months). 
DIVIDEND Common dividends divided by total assets. 
ROA The ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. 
NUM_COV The number of covenants in the loan contract. 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt divided by total assets. 
BOOK_MKT The book value of equity divided by market value of equity. 
SPREAD 
The total annual all-in drawn spread (in basis points) paid for each dollar drawn down under 
the loan commitment. 
lnFAC_AMT The natural log of facility amount (in $). 
lnMVAL The natural log of market value of equity. 
REVOLVER Indicator variable that equals 1 for revolving loans, and 0 for all other types of loans. 
CURRENT Current ratio (the ratio of current assets to current liabilities). 
Z_SCORE 
Altman’s (1968) Z-score = 1.2 (Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4 (Retained 
Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3 (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets) + 0.6 (Market 
Value of Equity/Book Value of Liabilities) + 0.999 (Net Sales/Total Assets). 
SP_RATED Indicator variable that equals 1 if the borrower has an S&P rating, and 0 otherwise. 
SECURED 
Indicator variable that equals 1 when the agreement is secured with collateral and 0 
otherwise. 
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CCA to be 
undertaken by 
an auditor 











accompanied by a certificate of said accountants that, in the course of their examination necessary for their 
certification of the foregoing, they have obtained no knowledge of any Default or Unmatured Default, or if, 














With each of the audited Financial Statements delivered pursuant to Section 5.2(a), a certificate of the 
independent certified public accountants that examined such statement to the effect that they have reviewed 
and are familiar with this Agreement and that, in examining such Financial Statements, they did not become 
aware of any fact or condition which then constituted a Default or Event of Default with respect to a 











simultaneously with the delivery of each set of financial statements referred to in subsection (a), a statement 
of the Independent Auditor which reported on such statements (i) whether anything has come to their 
attention to cause them to believe that any Default existed on the date of such  statements and (ii) confirming 
the  calculations set forth in the Compliance Certificate delivered simultaneously therewith pursuant to 
subsection (c) … 















together with a certificate of the chief financial officer, principal accounting officer or chief executive 
officer of Borrower, in the form of the Compliance Certificate, stating that, as of the date of such certificate, 
to the best of his knowledge and after reasonable inquiry, no event has occurred which constitutes a Default 
or an Event of Default or, if a Default or an Event of Default has occurred and is continuing, a statement as 
to the nature thereof and the action which Borrower has taken or proposes to take with respect thereto and 
further setting out in such detail as is reasonably required by Lenders Borrower’s compliance with the 
requirements of Article 7 and Sections 8.7 and 8.9. 
 















within 90 days after the end of each fiscal year of Holdings, Holdings’ audited consolidated balance sheets 
and related statements of operations, stockholders’ equity and cash flows as of the end of and for such year, 
setting forth in each case in comparative form the figures for the previous fiscal year, all reported on by 
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Deloitte & Touche LLP or other independent public accountants of recognized national standing (without 
a “going concern” or like qualification or exception and without any qualification or exception as to the 
scope of such audit or other material qualification or exception) to the effect that such consolidated financial 
statements present fairly in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Holdings 
and its consolidated Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis in accordance with GAAP consistently applied … 
Big 4 clause Credit 
Agreement, 
Akorn, Inc. and 
Akorn (New 
Jersey), Inc.,  






.. as soon as available, but not later than ninety (90) days after the end of each fiscal year, a copy of the 
audited consolidated and consolidating balance sheets of the Borrowers and each of their Subsidiaries as at 
the end of such year and the related consolidated and consolidating statements of income or operations, 
shareholders’ equity and cash flows for such fiscal year, setting forth in each case in comparative form the 
figures for the previous fiscal year, and accompanied by the unqualified opinion of any “Big Four” or 
other nationally-recognized independent public accounting firm reasonably acceptable to the Agent which 
report shall state that such consolidated financial statements present fairly in all material respects the 
financial position for the periods indicated in conformity with GAAP applied on a basis consistent with prior 
years. 
 
